Economic considerations of animal welfare policy by Bicknell, Kathryn B.
  
 
Economic Considerations of Animal Welfare 
Policy  
Kathryn Bicknell 
Faculty of Commerce 
Lincoln University 
Paper presented at the 2010 NZARES Conference 
Tahuna Conference Centre – Nelson, New Zealand. August 26-27, 2010 
Copyright by author(s). Readers may make copies of this document for non-commercial purposes only, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies 
Economic Considerations of Animal Welfare Policy 
Dr Kathryn Bicknell1 
Faculty of Commerce, Lincoln University, PO Box 84, Lincoln 7647 
 
Abstract 
Animal welfare considerations are becoming increasingly important for producers of animal-derived 
agricultural products. Recent media attention on issues of housing conditions for intensively reared 
livestock and induced calving in dairy production make it clear that some members of the public feel 
strongly about the overall welfare of farm animals. In many cases, practices that are now perceived 
as welfare unfriendly are also associated with lower per-unit costs of production, creating a ‘classic’ 
economic trade-off between production and welfare objectives.   
In this paper a relatively simple partial equilibrium model is used to illustrate that the distributional 
impacts of animal welfare regulations (for both humans and animals) depend critically on whether 
the domestic market is open to international competition. A preliminary case study involving 
housing options for sows in New Zealand provides an empirical illustration of the possible magnitude 
of the costs of welfare enhancing policies in a small open economy when the country is a net 
importer. The fact that welfare enhancing policy is driven by consumers who do not share the 
resulting economic burden raises important philosophical questions about how society defines what 
is acceptable on welfare grounds, and whether there is any economic justification for mitigating the 
costs when they accrue only to one sector of the economy. 
Keywords: Animal welfare; partial equilibrium analysis; externality; economic surplus 
1. Introduction 
Even casual attention to the popular press reveals that farm animal welfare issues are becoming 
increasingly important to consumers. Because concern over farm animal welfare issues is likely to 
correlate positively with income levels, animal welfare can be expected to be particularly high on the 
social agenda in developed countries. However, as the overall level of animal welfare increases, 
further gains in animal welfare are likely to be associated with higher per-unit costs of production, 
creating a classic economic trade-off between animal welfare and profit objectives for the producer 
(McInerney, 2004).  
Because increasing animal welfare involves real resource costs for society, farm animal welfare is at 
least partially within the domain of economics as a discipline. Indeed economic theory has much to 
offer the animal welfare debate (Bennett, 1997 and McInerney, 2004). Not only does economic 
theory provide a justification for government involvement in a market-oriented economy, even 
simple economic models can indicate the magnitude and distribution of the benefits and the costs of 
policies aimed at improving animal welfare.  
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In this paper attention is focused specifically on identifying the factors that determine the size and 
distribution of the resource costs of animal welfare policy. The simple theoretical model is then 
applied to the empirical example of housing options for sows in New Zealand. Results confirm that 
the marginal cost of increases in animal welfare increase as higher levels of welfare are achieved, 
and that the distribution of policy costs will depend critically on whether the economy is open to 
international trade.  
Once the magnitude of the aggregate resource costs of improving sow welfare have been presented, 
attention is focused on the amount of welfare that may be embodied in the pork available for 
domestic consumption under the different animal welfare policies. In this case where New Zealand 
can be considered a small open economy that is a net importer of pork, the net gains in the amount 
of welfare embodied in domestically consumed pork may be small as welfare policies become 
increasingly strict. This is due largely to the fact that domestic producers facing increasingly high 
compliance costs must compete with overseas producers who may not face similarly strict welfare 
standards. This raises important philosophical questions about the precise nature of the value of 
animal welfare outcomes, and whether they should logically depend on where the animals that 
contribute to consumptive output reside. 
2. Animal Welfare Defined 
Despite the increasing public awareness of animal welfare issues, it has been argued that defining 
the term ‘animal welfare’ in precise, scientific terms is not possible (Duncan, IJH 2005). However, is it 
also acknowledged (even by the same scientists) that most people do have an idea of what does (or 
does not) constitute ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ animal welfare. Particularly in recent years, a general 
consensus has emerged that animal welfare encompasses both the physical and ‘emotional’ state of 
the animal. 
Under the Animal Welfare Act 1999, people in New Zealand are legally obligated to ensure that the 
physical, health and behavioural needs of animals in their care are met in a manner that is in 
accordance with good practice and scientific knowledge (Animal Welfare Act, 1999). They are, in 
short, required to ensure that their animals exist in a reasonable state of welfare.  More specifically, 
the Act defines physical, health and behavioural needs as having access to and/or the ability to 
express the internationally recognised ‘five freedoms’, which can be summarised as follows: 
a) Access to proper and sufficient food and water; 
b) Access to adequate shelter; 
c) The opportunity to display normal patterns of behaviour; 
d) Physical handling in a manner which minimises the likelihood of unreasonable or 
unnecessary pain or distress: 
e) Protection from and rapid diagnosis of any significant injury or disease. 
There is a qualifier in the Act that the freedoms need to be interpreted in a manner that is 
appropriate to the species, environment and circumstances of the animal. 
3. Animal Welfare as an Externality 
In a mixed economy, market mechanisms have been shown to result in efficient outcomes, and 
therefore unrestricted markets are desirable if the goal is to maximise net social welfare. In some 
cases, however, markets will result in less than optimal outcomes. Externalities are one general class 
of market failure, and their existence is often cited as a rationale for government intervention.  An 
externality exists when the actions of one or more economic agents are able to influence the utility 
or satisfaction of other economic agents in a manner that is not reflected via price signals in the 
market in question (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). Within the current context, the production of 
animals and animal-related products under different management systems involves various levels or 
states of animal welfare. It is the joint production of animals (or animal products) and animal welfare 
that creates the external effect. 
McInerney (2004), Bennet (1997) and Carlsson et. al (2003) argue that animal welfare may enter the 
utility function of a consumer of animal products in two ways. In the first instance, a consumer might 
experience disutility if she feels that the animals that she consumers have been produced under 
conditions of low animal welfare. The consumer can internalise this disutility so long as animal 
products are clearly labelled with respect to the level of animal welfare they embody, and higher 
levels of welfare can be accompanied by price premiums. However, low levels of animal welfare may 
also impose a social cost on those who feel disutility due to the consumption choices of others who 
may support a lower standard of welfare than they are willing to accept. This social cost cannot be 
reflected in the market, and therefore represents an external effect. 
A wide range of potential policy responses to externalities have been promulgated. Broadly 
speaking, the list includes doing nothing, assisting with the development of a functioning market, 
creating a system of financial incentives (or disincentives) and regulation or ‘command and control’ 
policies. New Zealand takes a statutory approach to ensuring that a reasonable level of animal 
welfare is maintained. Under the Animal Welfare Act, legally binding minimum standards are 
established to set a ‘lower bound’ for animal welfare, and recommended best practices (which are 
not legally binding) are promoted to encourage a higher level of commitment to animal well being. 
This approach is consistent with the view espoused by McInerney (2004), that animal welfare 
exhibits public good characteristics at very low levels, and the government is well justified in 
requiring that a minimum standard be met. 
Setting minimum standards is far from trivial, however, and an economic framework can be a useful 
way to consider both the costs and the benefits of animal welfare policy. The mere existence of an 
external effect does not warrant government intervention. In order to determine whether 
intervention is can be justified on economic grounds, it is necessary to evaluate both the costs and 
the benefits of intervention.  In this paper I will not consider the contentious topic of valuing animal 
welfare benefits. Rather I will focus on the task of developing a very simple partial equilibrium model 
that can be used to identify the factors that are likely to affect the magnitude and distribution of the 
costs of farm animal welfare policy. The model will then be applied to the empirical problem of sow 
welfare in New Zealand. 
4. Modelling the resource costs of animal welfare policy 
In this section a very simple partial equilibrium model will be used to clarify how the social costs of 
animal welfare policies can be considered, and the factors that are likely to influence how the costs 
are distributed across various members of society. 
  
4.1 A closed economy 
The model is a very basic economic surplus model of the type that Alston, Norton and Pardey (1998) 
advocate and develop to calculate the benefits of agricultural research. The obvious difference is 
that animal welfare policy will generally increase per-unit costs of production, whereas agricultural 
research is aimed at reducing production costs. 









Beyond a certain level of welfare, animal welfare enhancing policy is likely to increase per-unit costs 
of production. This will shift the supply curve to the left, from S0 to S1. Initial equilibrium in Figure 1 
occurs where S0 = D, at a price and quantity of P0 and Q0, respectively. The impact of the policy is 
therefore to increase the price and reduce the quantity in a manner that is consistent with a 
potential Pareto improvement in the presence of a negative production externality. The price impact 
on the consumers of the animal product is unambiguously negative, and can be approximated by the 
area P1abP0, which represents that change in consumer surplus. Producers lose the area debc, but 
gain the area P1aeP0. The net annual resource cost to society is the area dabc.  Note that the impact 
of the welfare enhancing policy does not fall uniformly on producers as a whole. Producers who 
were already using systems consistent with the policy will gain from the price increase without 
incurring any additional resource cost. 
Under certain assumptions about the functional forms of supply and demand, as well as the nature 
of the supply shift, changes in consumer, producer and total surplus can be estimated using demand 
and supply elasticities, along with knowledge of the original equilibrium (Alston and Pardy, YEAR). As 
with all forms of ‘tax’, the economic burden of the policy costs will be determined by the relative 
magnitude of the supply and demand elasticities. 
It is possible to enhance this model substantially by explicitly incorporating multiple levels along the 
supply chain and/or heterogeneous regions or producer groups, but this simple model represents a 
good starting point for enhancing our understanding of policy impacts. If values are calculated at the 
farm level, the loss in consumer surplus represents the aggregate cost to consumers of the animal 
product at all levels. How much of this price increase is actually transferred to increases at the retail 












Note that this model is relatively silent on the transition to the new equilibrium. It implicitly assumes 
that non-compliant producers will incur the cost of adopting the welfare-enhancing technology. The 
capital cost of the transition is not a net resource cost to society, but could be a political concern and 
should therefore be considered at least qualitatively. 
4.2 The impact of trade 
As emphasized by Alston, Norton and Pardey (1998), when the closed economy assumption is 
relaxed, the distributional impacts domestic supply shifts change significantly (Figure 2). In the 
analysis that follows, the country is assumed to be a net importer because this is consistent with the 
empirical application presented in the next section. Following the traditional ‘small country 
assumption’, the domestic supply is now a ‘stepwise’ function, determined by domestic factors at 
prices below the world price, but perfectly elastic once the world price (Pw) is reached. The direct 
impact of the policy is still to shift the domestic supply curve to the left. Because domestic price is 
determined by the world market, however, there is now no price effect for consumers. As a result, 
domestic producers bear the entire cost of the policy, and any reduction in domestic supply is met 
by an increase in imports. 












There is an additional complication associated with this open economy assumption. Because the cost 
increasing policy is not accompanied by a subsequent price increase, it may be difficult for non-
complying farmers to secure the finance they require to switch to a new management system.  This 
will be exacerbated by the fact that many of the more welfare-friendly systems are also more 
management and labour intensive, which further complicates the transition. 
As a result, affected producers may decide to exit the industry as opposed to adopting the new 













costs on society provided that the pig farmers can find gainful employment elsewhere, it does 
impose at least a transitional cost on society in the form of pre-mature asset write-off and 
temporary unemployment.  
The magnitude of industry exit may also have important implications for animal welfare on a more 
‘global’ scale, as a reduction in the number of producers will further shift the supply curve 
(consistent with a move from S1 to S2 in Figure 3), which will result in still more imports. If imports 
are sourced from countries that impose fewer animal welfare restrictions on producers, then it is 
possible that the welfare embodied in the meat that is consumed within the domestic economy will 
decline if animal welfare policies are particularly strict by international standards. 












5. Empirical Application: Housing Options for Gestating (Dry) Sows 
Housing options for gestating sows provides an interesting empirical application for this simple 
model. Dry sow stalls are used by pig farmers throughout the world to house pregnant sows. They 
simplify the management of the pigs, particularly during relatively ‘hormonal’ periods of time, and 
they make it easier for producers to ensure that individual dietary and health needs are met. There 
is increasing public resistance to their use, however, because they provide a particularly barren 
environment that does not allow the sow to display normal patterns of behaviour. 
In New Zealand, the current Code of Welfare for Pigs allows for the unlimited use of dry sow stalls 
until 2015, when the use of dry sow stalls must be limited to no more than four weeks after mating 
(NAWAC, 2005). The four week restriction recognizes the balance of opinion in the scientific 
literature, which suggests that production losses associated with group housing can be mitigated if 
sows are confined for 28 days after mating. In practice, this means that it is currently possible for 














In 2009, the National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC) extensively reviewed of the 
2005 Code of Welfare for Pigs. In early 2010 a new Draft Code was released for public consultation. 
In the Draft Code it was suggested that the four week restriction on dry sow stall use be brought 
forward to 2012, and that dry sow stalls be entirely phased out from a date to be determined after 
consideration of public submissions (NAWAC, 2010). 
5.1 Farm-level impact 
5.1.1 Financial cost of restricting the use of sow stalls 
The economic analysis (MAFBNZ, 2010) that accompanied the public release of the Draft Code 
indicates that a four week restriction on the use of dry sow stalls will cause a slight increase in labour 
and feed costs. Banning stalls altogether will have a further impact on variable costs, and also reduce 
sow productivity. In both cases reducing the use of stalls also requires additional capital investment 
and resource consents.  
The estimated cost increases, combined with farm budget information produced by Lincoln 
University, provide an indication of the magnitude of the farm-level financial impact of the 
alternative housing options for a 250-sow operation: 
Table 1  Financial cost of animal welfare policies at the farm-level 
 4 Week Restriction Ban 
Increase in feed costs $8,100.00 $10,500.00 
Increase in labour costs $5,000.00 $6,700.00 
Reduced productivity $0 $60,600.00 
Increased capital investmenta $11,400.00 $14,700.00 
Total Cost $24,500.00 $92,500.00 
Resource consent costs $2,000 - $10,000 + $2,000 - $10,000 + 
a
 Amortised and expressed as an annual flow 
 
5.1.2 Benefits of restricting sow stall use 
The primary benefit of reducing the use of dry sows is the additional opportunity that sows have to 
display normal patterns of behaviour. One measure of the ‘output’ or ‘benefit’ of these housing 
policies is therefore the number of ‘crate days saved’.  Given the reproductive biology of a sow, 
unlimited use of dry stalls implies that a sow will be confined in a stall for an average of 42.8 weeks 
(or approximately 300 days) per year. Restricting the use of stalls to four weeks after mating reduces 
that time to approximately 67 days, for a reduction of 233 days. Banning stall use altogether reduces 
confinement time a further 67 days. Confinement time in various housing options is shown in Figure 
4, which highlights the large marginal gain associated with a four week restriction relative to a ban. 
  
Figure 4 Confinement time associated with various housing options 
 
Because 1) a four week restriction is associated with a relatively large gain in the number of ‘crate-
free days’, and 2) a total ban on the use of stalls is associated with relatively large productivity loss, 
the marginal cost per unit of welfare gained of a total ban is very high (Figure 5). This data therefore 
confirms the theoretical prediction that the marginal cost of improving animal welfare is likely to 
increasing. 
Figure 5 Marginal cost of increasing welfare (cost per crate-free day) 
 
  
5.2 Industry level impact 
Empirical application of the simple partial equilibrium model requires an estimate of the vertical 
shift in the supply curve due to increasing per-unit costs of production, as well as an estimate of the 
horizontal shift in the supply curve due to policy-induced industry exit. 
A four week restriction on the use of dry sow stalls is expected to impose a relatively minor resource 
cost on society. An estimate of the vertical shift in the supply curve resulting from this policy can be 
obtained by combining the variable cost impact with estimates of the number of pigs affected by the 
restriction. The result is a vertical supply shift of less than 1%. This policy is assumed to be 
accompanied by relatively low industry exit because the overall financial implications are relatively 
minor when compared to a complete ban. For illustrative purposes, industry exit under this scenario 
was assumed to cause a 5% vertical shift in the supply curve. 
The aggregate resource cost associated with increasing the variable cost of production for non-
complying farmers is approximately $400,000 per year. Expressed in NPV terms over a 20 year time 
horizon, the aggregate cost of the four week restriction is approximately $4.3 million. The capital 
adjustment costs required to either exit or comply with the ban impose an additional one-off 
financial cost of approximately $4,000,000. Once again, this loss of economic surplus is borne 
entirely by producers in the open economy model. 
By contrast, a complete ban is expected to have a more dramatic effect on both the vertical and the 
horizontal shifts of the domestic supply curve. More specifically, the combination of increases in 
variable cost and a drop in productivity for affected farmers are assumed to shift the aggregate 
supply function vertically by approximately 4%. For illustrative purposes it was assumed that more of 
the affected farmers would fail to obtain the finances and/or management skill necessary to adopt 
stall-free management practices, causing the supply curve to shift horizontally by 10%  
The aggregate resource cost of a ban on sow stalls (relative to the status quo), is nearly $4 million 
per year. The capital adjustment costs required to either exit or comply impose an additional one-off 
cost of similar magnitude to the four week restriction when the four week restriction comes into 
effect, and then an additional $1 million when the ban is imposed. The NPV of this policy is just over 
$30 million over a 20 year time horizon using a five percent discount rate. 
Table 2  Aggregate impact of animal welfare policies 
 Four Week Restriction Ban 
Resource Cost $406,000/year $3.78 million/year 
One-off financial cost $3.7 million $3.6 million + $1 million 
Change in domestic supply 2.2% reduction 9% reduction 
Change in imports 3.5% increase 16.1% increase 
 
5.3 Animal Welfare Embodied in Pork Consumed in New Zealand  
A question worth asking is whether the meat that is available for consumption in New Zealand will 
embody higher levels of welfare after more welfare friendly policies are imposed. There are no 
tariffs applied to pig meat imported into NZ from Australia or Canada, while the USA enjoys ‘most 
favoured nation’ status with NZ, so processed pig meat from the USA is subject to a 5% tariff.  Import 
substitution is therefore possible, particularly in the processed market where ‘shelf-life’ is less of an 
issue. Non-tariff (sanitary) restrictions severely limit the importation of fresh pig meat, although 
imports from Australia are allowed. 
Recent trends show that imports of pig meat into NZ have doubled over the past 10 years, and in 
2008 amounted to approximately 30 thousand tons, or nearly 40% of what is consumed 
domestically.  The vast majority of the pig meat imported into NZ is for the processed market.  
Approximately 75% of the processed pig meat eaten in NZ is now imported. Most pork (product 
weight) imported into New Zealand comes from Canada, the EU, Australia, or the USA. Australia and 
the EU have both indicated that they will be moving to restrict (but not ban) the use of dry sow stalls 
within the next 5 or ten years. Although concern has been raised about the use of stalls in North 
America, neither Canada nor the USA have indicated that they will ban the use of stalls at the 
national level in the foreseeable future. 
Using some relatively simple conversion ratios for sow productivity and carcass weight, it is possible 
to calculate the number of ‘crate days’ required to produce a particular amount of pork under 
different housing assumptions. This done for the status quo (which currently imposes no active 
restrictions on sow stall use), a nationally imposed four week restriction, and a national ban (Figure 
6). For this preliminary analysis, additional imports are assumed to be produced in countries such as 
the USA and Canada, where welfare standards are low. Clearly changes in this assumption will have 
an impact on the results, but the main issue of ‘embodied sow welfare’ relates to the level of import 
substitution and how New Zealand policy compares to that of her trading partners. 
Figure 6 Crate Days Embodied in Pig Meat Consumed in NZ under different domestic welfare 
policies 
 
Under the assumptions governing this preliminary analysis, the overall welfare status embodied in 
the pork consumed in New Zealand is, in fact, higher under a complete ban than a four week 
restriction. It is worth noting, however, that the marginal gain in overall welfare status (as measured 
by a reduction in crate-days) is relatively small relative to the additional cost imposed by a ban. 
Overseas experience with animal welfare policy provides an indication of how other countries have 
chosen to approach the contentious distributional impacts of animal welfare policies. The approach 
taken differs among countries, and includes subsidizing welfare friendly management systems and 
assisting affected producers to exit the industry. Sow gestation stalls have been banned in Norway, 
Sweden and the UK, and their use has been severely restricted in Switzerland and the Netherlands. 
Because Switzerland and Norway are not members of the EU, it is relatively easy to obtain country-
specific information about the degree to which pig farmers are supported in these countries.  
In 2009, the Producer Single Commodity Transfers for pig meat in Norway and Switzerland were 
approximately 47% and 54%, respectively. Market price support made up the bulk of this figure for 
both countries.  In other words, producers in those countries derived in the neighbourhood of half of 
their income directly from government programmes that support the price of domestic pork.  
Domestic prices are maintained at high levels in these countries with high tariff barriers to trade. 
In the UK, where direct commodity support and steep tariffs are less of an option, a programme was 
instituted to assist farmers in exiting the industry. This at least partially explains why, in the years 
following the ban on gestation stalls, pig meat production in the UK declined by approximately 40%. 
Because consumption remained relatively static, the difference between domestic production and 
consumption was made up via imports from Denmark, which restricts but does not ban the use of 
stalls. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper is not unique in maintaining that economics can make an important contribution to the 
on-going farm animal welfare debate. McInerney observed some time ago that, although the 
relationship may be complementary at low levels of welfare, eventually there is a trade-off between 
further gains in animal welfare and efficiency objectives for society. Science and innovation produce 
a continual stream of cost reducing technologies, and the profit motive provides incentive for their 
adoption (McInerney, 2004). It has been argued that while the external or public good 
characteristics of animal welfare outcomes provide one of the necessary conditions for government 
intervention, they certainly do not provide a sufficient condition (Carlsson, et. al, 2003). At the very 
least economists can assist with identifying and valuing the range of costs and benefits associated 
with animal welfare, thereby assisting with the development of efficient welfare policies. 
This paper does, however, make at least three distinctive contributions. The first is to provide 
empirical support for the theoretical claim that the marginal cost of supplying welfare outcomes is 
increasing as the overall level of welfare rises.  This paper also illustrates that the distribution of 
policy costs will be strongly influenced by the presence of international trade. Finally, the paper uses 
empirical data to begin to explore the question of whether domestic animal welfare policies could 
possibly have the ‘perverse’ effect of actually reducing the amount of welfare embodied in the meat 
we consume. While the tentative answer to that question is ‘not necessarily’, it highlights the critical 
role of ethical assumptions and raises additional philosophical questions about the equity of 
imposing the entire cost of a public good on one sector of the economy. This is particularly the case 
when policies set in other arenas – which may place different weight on ethical versus efficiency 
considerations – require the same group to compete in an international marketplace where different 
cultural norms towards animals set alternative welfare standards 
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